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 Old and Difficult Grievances: 
Examining the Relationship Between 
the Métis and the Crown  
Jean Teillet* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1982, Canada took the unique and unprecedented step of giving 
constitutional protection to the Aboriginal and treaty rights of the “abo-
riginal peoples of Canada” in section 35. 
 
35(1) The Aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of 
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.  
35(2) For the purposes of this Act, the “aboriginal peoples of Can-
ada” includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.  
 
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is unprecedented in two 
ways. First, it gives constitutional protection to Aboriginal and treaty 
rights. Second, it includes a mixed-blood people, the Métis, within the 
definition of the “aboriginal peoples of Canada”. There is no other coun-
try in the world that has taken either step. 
It has been noted by the Supreme Court of Canada that the inclusion 
of section 35 in the Constitution Act, 1982 was the culmination of a long 
and arduous struggle by all the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.1 Indeed, 
the three national Aboriginal organizations of the day, the National 
Indian Brotherhood, the Native Council of Canada and the Inuit Tapiri-
sat, worked together to achieve the entrenchment of Aboriginal and 
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1
  R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 1105, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49 [hereinafter 
“Sparrow”]. 
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treaty rights in the Constitution.2 At the same time, several non-
Aboriginal bodies were also calling for constitutional reform that in-
cluded protection for Aboriginal peoples. By the fall of 1980, there was 
public support for the idea of entrenching Aboriginal rights in the Con-
stitution. The Canadian Bar Association, the Pepin-Robarts Task Force 
on Canadian Unity, a Joint Senate-House of Commons Committee on 
the Constitution, and several church groups all called for the constitu-
tional protection of Aboriginal rights.3  
The political debates in both the House of Commons and in the 
Senate calling for constitutional protection for Aboriginal peoples and 
their rights are illuminating. There was a consensus that the Aboriginal 
peoples of Canada had “old and difficult grievances” that required rec-
onciliation.4 The debates reflect a unanimous recognition that govern-
ment had ancient legal obligations to Aboriginal peoples and that the 
relationship with the Crown and the practices of the past needed to 
change. 
The move to give the rights of Aboriginal peoples constitutional 
protection was clearly intended to be a substantive change in the rela-
tionship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown. The constitutional 
debates reflect this and show that section 35 was to be “a turning point 
in the status of native peoples in this country”, “a renewal of our com-
mitment to the native peoples”, an “historic recommendation of equality 
of constitutional standing of the Aboriginal peoples with other commu-
nities in Canada” and “a political watershed in the lives of the Aborigi-
nal people in Canada”. Finally, that including section 35 in the 
Constitution would mean that, “no government or individual will again 
                                                                                                                                
2
  Note that these three groups represented the Indians, Inuit and Métis peoples of Can-
ada in the constitutional negotiations of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The national bodies 
that represent these three distinct Aboriginal peoples in 2004 are the Assembly of First 
Nations, the Métis National Council, and the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami. The former Native 
Council of Canada is now known as the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, which claims to 
represent a mixture of off-reserve, status, and non-status Aboriginal individuals. This claim is 
disputed by the Assembly of First Nation, which claims to represent all Indians whether on or 
off reserve, and by the Métis National Council which claims to represent all members of the 
Métis Nation. 
3
  Hogg, Canada Act 1982 Annotated (1982), at 1-3, 69 and 81-83; Purich, The Metis 
(1988), at 167-169; Romanow, “Aboriginal Rights in the Constitutional Process” in Boldt and 
Long (eds.), Quest for Justice (1985), at 73-74. 
4
  Hansard of the House of Commons and Senate of Canada 1980-1982, re inclusion of 
s. 35, statement by Senator Austin in Senate Debates, at 3317. 
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be able to put aside or disregard the rights of Canada’s original peoples” 
because Parliament has taken the “opportunity of redressing their claims 
in the Constitution and to provide a legal basis for it”.5 
That was 1982. It is now more than 20 years since that monumental 
constitutional change was made. Since 1982, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has brought down more than 35 judgments with respect to the 
Aboriginal and treaty rights of Indians. With respect to the Métis, the 
first judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Powley, was 
handed down in 2003.6 At this point, with a substantial body of Abo-
riginal constitutional law now in place, and a new Supreme Court of 
Canada decision that applies that body of law to the Métis, it is worth 
asking whether section 35 is providing a resolution to the old and diffi-
cult grievances.  
II. WHAT ARE THE OLD AND DIFFICULT GRIEVANCES? 
The old and difficult grievances all stem from the problematic rela-
tionship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown. What was the 
relationship just prior to 1982? It was unbalanced, to say the least. The 
Crown held the power, the lands, the resources, the courts, the law en-
forcement and the money. By 1982, Aboriginal peoples held, for the 
most part, only the equities.  
The inclusion of section 35 in the Constitution Act, 1982 was in-
tended to even out the power relationship. But perhaps with the hind-
sight of 20 years we can see that, in 1982, little thought appears to have 
been given as to exactly how section 35 would restrain the powers of the 
Crown. Even less thought appears to have been given as to how the 
Crown would react to this encroachment and that it might act to protect 
its authority and jurisdiction. 
In argument before the Supreme Court of Canada from 1984 to 
2004, federal and provincial Crowns have consistently resisted the con-
clusion that constitutional space for Aboriginal peoples means any re-
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straint on Crown jurisdiction or authority.7 For 20 years, the Crown has 
argued any one or more of the following: that section 35 is merely of a 
preambular character; that section 35 undermines the balance of federal-
ism; that section 35 prevents government from governing; that the 
courts ought not to inquire into provincial decision making; that the 
Crown cannot discharge its burden; that the Crown’s duty is not en-
gaged; that the province is not in a position to …; that the duty stops 
short of …; that their obligations are political; not legal; not enforce-
able; not fiduciary; not constitutional — no, not us, or at the very least 
not yet.8  
With respect to the Métis, the litany of denial is slightly different. 
For Métis, the Crown’s complaint is that it does not know who the Métis 
are; that the Métis are merely individuals with some Aboriginal ances-
try; that their rights are derivative or dependant on Indian rights; that 
while Indians may have Aboriginal rights, Métis have none; that while 
Indians may have Aboriginal title, Métis have none; that Métis organi-
zations are not legally capable of representing them; that they are not 
collectives; that the government has no obligations to Métis; that they 
are a provincial responsibility (from the federal government); that they 
are a federal responsibility (from the provincial governments); that there 
may be Métis in that province, but not in this province; that wherever 
and whoever those people might be they are not rights holders; they are 
not really Aboriginal or at least not Aboriginal enough; and anyway 
they all disappeared when Louis Riel was hanged in 1885. The Métis 
are, according to the Crown, non-existent or non-ascertainable as a 
people, and certainly not anyone or any entity that engages the recogni-
tion or any obligations of any of the governments in Canada. 
From this litany we can see at least two fundamental issues with re-
spect to the Métis that the Crown relies on in order to continue its course 
of denial. Both create roadblocks to the meaningful implementation of 
section 35. The first issue is this — does the Crown have constitutional 
                                                                                                                                
7
  In particular, see Crown arguments as set out in Guerin v. Canada, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 
335 [hereinafter “Guerin”]; Sparrow, supra, note 1; Delgammuukw v. British Columbia, 
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108; Powley, supra, note 6.  
8
  A variation of this paragraph was argued orally by Louise Mandell before the Su-
preme Court of Canada on March 26th 2004 in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of 
Forests), [2002] 2 C.N.L.R. 121, [2002] B.C.J. No. 378 (C.A.) [hereinafter “Haida Nation]. 
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and/or fiduciary obligations to the Métis? If so, how is it required to 
implement those obligations?  
The second issue is this — when do the Crown obligations to the 
Métis arise? The Crown has consistently argued that any fiduciary obli-
gations it might have do not arise until there is a court-determined, site 
specific Aboriginal right. With respect to the Métis, the Crown denies 
any fiduciary relationship or obligations under any circumstances. 
This paper will examine both of these issues in light of another issue 
— how and when is the Crown to implement a constitutional or fiduci-
ary relationship with the Métis — an Aboriginal people it has rarely 
acknowledged and no longer knows.  
III. THE CROWN’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MÉTIS 
The common law of Aboriginal rights developed in the context of 
the colonial experience in North America and has always been part of 
our constitutional law. The doctrine of Aboriginal rights is Canadian 
common law and it defines the constitutional relationship between the 
Crown and Aboriginal peoples.9 McLachlin J. explained this relation-
ship in her decision in Van der Peet,  
These arrangements [in the Royal Proclamation] bear testimony to the 
acceptance by the colonizers of the principle that the aboriginal peoples 
who occupied what is now Canada were regarded as possessing the 
Aboriginal right to live off their lands and the resources found in their 
forests and streams to the extent they had traditionally done so. The 
fundamental understanding – the grundnorm of settlement in Canada – 
was that the Aboriginal people could only be deprived of the sustenance 
they traditionally drew from the land and adjacent waters by solemn treaty 
with the Crown, on terms that would ensure to them and their successors a 
replacement for the livelihood that their lands, forests and streams had 
since ancestral times provided them…10 
Unfortunately, the division of legislative powers and property set 
out in the Constitution Act, 1867 was not sufficient to ensure that gov-
                                                                                                                                
9
  Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1983) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727, at 732 
and 736-37. 
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  R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at para. 272, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, per McLachlin 
J. (as she then was) dissenting on other grounds [hereinafter “Van der Peet”]. 
296  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
ernments kept faith with the grundnorm on which the settlement of the 
country was based. It is for this reason that when the Constitution Act, 
1982 was enacted there was a political consensus to include section 35.  
In 1984 and in 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Guerin and 
Sparrow, set out the fundamental framework for analysis of section 35. 
The court held that the approach to be taken with respect to interpreting 
the meaning of section 35(1) is derived from general principles of con-
stitutional interpretation, principles relating to Aboriginal rights, and the 
purposes behind the constitutional provision itself. They said that sec-
tion 35 was to be construed in a purposive way.  
The Court understood that the relationship between Aboriginal peo-
ples and the Crown had to be addressed. It was not enough to address 
the specific events that gave rise to the Court action. The Court held that 
Aboriginal peoples and the Crown were in a fiduciary relationship and 
in light of that relationship, ways and means had to be found to protect 
Aboriginal peoples within the Canadian legislative, regulatory and pol-
icy regimes. The choice of fiduciary law was explained in Guerin, 
[Where there is a fiduciary obligation] there is a relation in which the 
principal’s interests can be affected by, and therefore dependent on, the 
manner in which the fiduciary uses the discretion which has been 
delegated to him. The fiduciary obligation is the law’s blunt tool for the 
control of this discretion.11 
In Guerin, the Crown argued that if there was a trust, it was, at best, 
a political trust, enforceable only in Parliament and not a true trust, 
enforceable in the courts.12 The Court expressly disagreed and held that 
even though the Crown’s obligations could not be defined as a trust that 
did not mean that the Crown owed no enforceable duty to the Indians. 
As the Court explained six years later in Sparrow, the constitutional 
relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown required a 
broad application of fiduciary law,  
The sui generis nature of Indian title, and the historic powers and 
responsibilities assumed by the Crown constitute the source of such a 
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  Guerin, supra, note 7, at 28, per Dickson J. (as he then was) quoting with approval 
from Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation (1975) 25 U.T.L.J. 1, at 7; Wewaykum Indian Band 
v. Canada, 2002 SCC 79, at para. 80, [2002] S.C.J. No. 79 [hereinafter “Wewaykum”]. 
12
  Guerin, supra, note 7, at 9 and 21, per Dickson J. 
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fiduciary obligation ... the Government has the responsibility to act in a 
fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples. The relationship 
between the Government and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than 
adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal 
rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship. Section 35(1) is 
a solemn commitment that must be given meaningful content. Yet, we 
find that the words “recognition and affirmation” incorporate the fiduciary 
relationship referred to earlier and so import some restraint on the exercise 
of sovereign power. In other words, federal power must be reconciled with 
federal duty … Such scrutiny is in keeping with the concept of holding the 
Crown to a high standard of honourable dealing with respect to the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada.13 
The purpose of all of the Supreme Court findings with respect to the 
relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown has been to 
facilitate reconciliation. Reconciliation requires three things — a work-
ing relationship, restraint on the exercise of governmental powers, and 
the creation of constitutional space that allows Aboriginal peoples to 
exercise and enjoy their rights and title. But section 35 did not give 
Aboriginal peoples the authority to protect their rights and interests 
themselves, nor did it alter the distribution of legislative powers. It did 
not give absolute status to Aboriginal and treaty rights. Instead, the 
Constitution Act, 1982 simply “recognized and affirmed” Aboriginal 
rights in section 35. It is the Supreme Court of Canada that has read 
recognition and affirmation as incorporating constitutional restraints on 
the Crown’s exercise of its legislative and administrative powers.  
The constitutional recognition afforded by [section 35] therefore gives a 
measure of control over government conduct and a strong check on 
legislative power. While it does not promise immunity from government 
regulation … it does hold the Crown to a substantive promise.14 
The restraint, the “strong check on legislative power”, has been articu-
lated in terms of broad principles — fiduciary relationship, justification and 
consultation. These are not the legal mechanisms for defining the existence 
of the Aboriginal right. Rather, they are the legal mechanisms for defining 
and enforcing the constitutional restraints on governments.  
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  Sparrow, supra, note 1, at 1108; Wewaykum, supra, note 11, at paras. 74-79. 
14
  Sparrow, supra, note 1, at 1010. 
298  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
From the vantage point of 2004, it seems that the inclusion of section 
35 in the Constitution Act, 1982 may not be having the effect intended by 
its creators. It does not seem to be a renewal of our commitment to the 
native peoples, nor has it been an historic recommendation of equality of 
constitutional standing of the Aboriginal peoples with other communities 
in Canada.  
Basic scientific theory holds that to every action there is always op-
posed an equal reaction.15 If this theory applies to government, then we 
should not be surprised that section 35 seems to have had the effect of 
entrenching the Crown in an equal and opposite position of denial 
thereby creating an adversarial state of siege as between Aboriginal 
peoples and the Crown. This is particularly true of its relationship with 
the Métis. A relationship that can best be discerned by its absence.  
The Crown often argues that it does not know who the Métis are. 
Yet both federal and provincial governments have taken few steps, if 
any, to find a contemporary answer to this complaint. Such willful igno-
rance should be unacceptable in a fiduciary. While, the Supreme Court 
of Canada has held that not all actions of the Crown trigger its fiduciary 
obligations, it has recently affirmed that the principle “applies to the 
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples”.16 On this basis 
it seems logical to presume that a fiduciary has at least one positive 
obligation in the absence of a triggering event — the obligation to identify 
the people with whom it has a relationship. If the Crown, as a fiduciary, 
fails to carry out this most basic activity surely it cannot then use its igno-
rance as an excuse to deny its obligations or to defeat rights. Indeed the 
Supreme Court said precisely this in Powley: 
The appellant advances a subsidiary argument for justification based on 
the alleged difficulty of identifying who is Métis … The development of a 
more systematic method of identifying Métis rights-holders for the 
purpose of enforcing hunting regulations is an urgent priority. That said, 
the difficulty of identifying members of the Métis community must not be 
exaggerated as a basis for defeating their rights under the Constitution of 
Canada.17 
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  Isaac Newton, Principia Mathematica (1687). 
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  Wewaykum, supra, note 11, at para. 83. 
17
  Powley, supra, note 6, at para. 49. 
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This contemporary claim of ignorance with respect to the identity of 
the Métis is convenient and new. In the past the government has quite 
adequately identified the Métis. Indeed, numerous counts of the Métis 
were carried out in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. That is how 
scrip was distributed to thousands of Métis on the Prairies. Treaty com-
missioners made it a usual practice to count the Indians and the Métis. 
Hudson Bay Company records and census takers also identified Métis. 
The real problem is that government neglected to keep its records up to 
date. It appears to have made its decision to stop acknowledging the 
Métis in the belief that two events extinguished the very existence of the 
Métis people — the distribution of scrip and the hanging of Louis Riel. 
While scrip may have had some legal effect on the Aboriginal title of 
the Métis, and the hanging of one man, Riel, certainly acted as a strong 
deterrent to political action, neither of these actions had the legal or 
physical effect of eradicating an entire people.18 The Métis people are 
still here, as an Aboriginal people. 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Sparrow held that the Crown’s fi-
duciary relationship is with the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.19 It was 
open to the Court, in view of the fact that Sparrow was about the fishing 
rights of Indians, to limit the fiduciary relationship to Indians and not 
use the more inclusive term Aboriginal peoples. Further, the Court 
stated that it was the term “recognize and affirm” from section 35 that 
imported the fiduciary relationship. In view of this, and when combined 
with the Court’s admonition in Powley, it would seem likely that the 
fiduciary relationship, which applies to the “aboriginal peoples of Can-
ada”, includes the Métis.  
Can the Crown legitimately claim ignorance about the difficulties of 
identifying the Métis? The historical record shows that the Crown has, 
in the past, identified Métis when it saw fit. The record also shows that 
                                                                                                                                
18
  For more on scrip see: Sprague and Frye, Genealogy of the First Métis Nation 
(1981); see also R. v. Morin and Daigneault, [1996] 3 C.N.L.R. 157, [1996] S.J. No. 262 
(Prov. Ct.), affd [1998] 1 C.N.L.R. 182, [1997] S.J. No. 529 (Sask. Q.B.), in which the court 
considered the question of the effect of scrip on Métis harvesting rights. In that case the court 
held that scrip was silent on hunting and fishing, did not meet the clear and plain extinguish-
ment test, and therefore did not extinguish Métis hunting and fishing rights. For more on the 
defects in the trial of Louis Riel see: Bumsted, Louis Riel v. Canada: The Making of a Rebel 
(2001); and see also Olesky, Louis Riel and the Crown Letters (February, 1998) Canadian 
Lawyer. 
19
  Sparrow, supra, note 1, at 1108. 
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much of the current difficulty with identification of the Métis is a direct 
result of Crown law and policy. Having noted that the Crown itself may 
be to blame for the identification uncertainty, we are still left with ques-
tions. What are the identification difficulties? What does “Métis” mean? 
Who is included? Can the Crown continue to use this excuse to deny 
Métis recognition? 
IV. THE COMPLEX REALITY OF MÉTIS IDENTIFICATION  
In law, prior to 1982 there were different names for all of the Abo-
riginal peoples of Canada. At the beginning of the 21st century we use 
the terms First Nations, Inuit and Métis. Throughout most of the 19th 
and 20th centuries these same people were known as Indians, Eskimos 
and Half-breeds. None of these terms accurately reflect the cultural 
societies of the peoples they purport to describe. For example, “Indian” 
is a legal term that includes many distinct cultures – Mohawk, Cree, 
Tlingit, etc.  
Since 1982, Indians have been gradually adopting the term “First 
Nations” and at the same time reclaiming their own language names. 
For example, the Tlicho were formerly known in English as the Do-
gribs. The Inuit were previously known as “Eskimos” but are also “Indi-
ans” within the meaning of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 
1867.20  
The term “Métis” now replaces the term “half-breeds”. Under the 
previous English-language designation, “half-breeds” were recognized 
by the British imperial government and by the government of Canada. 
Generally speaking, “half-breeds” were seen by government as individu-
als with some claim to Aboriginal rights and title, but were not recognized 
as an Aboriginal people. Using the term “half-breed” implies that one is 
an individual who has “mixed-blood” or is “half-Indian”. The very term 
“half-breed” or “mixed-blood” has much less political significance 
than terms such as “the Métis” or “the Métis Nation” because such 
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  Reference re British North America Act, 1867 (U.K.), s. 91, [1939] S.C.R. 104. 
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individuals are considered to be distantly connected to Indian nations 
and any rights they have would derive from that connection.21  
There is a distinction between the legal terms used to describe Abo-
riginal peoples and the terms they self-ascribe. The legal terms reflect 
the universal practice of outside naming, or recognition by others, of the 
existence of a people who are different. The term “Métis” is unique in 
that it is a legal term and self-ascribed in the west-central parts of Can-
ada.22 This is unlike the use of the term “Indian”, which is a legal term 
and not self-ascribed. The term “half-breed” reflects the concept of 
outside naming by English speaking historians, lawyers and settlers. The 
Cree also practiced outside naming by calling the Métis apeytogosan — 
meaning half-people. The Cree also coined another term for the Métis 
— otepayemsuak — meaning “the independent ones”. To the Cree, the 
Métis were otpayemsuak because their communities were distinct from 
both the non-Indian and Indian communities and because most Métis 
considered the treaty and reserve system to equate to a loss of their 
highly valued independence.  
Although the term “Métis” and “Métis Nation” were self-ascribed in 
the early 19th century, the Métis have also had many names attributed to 
them by outsiders — half-breed, chicot, freemen, bois-brulé, michif, the 
flower beading people, the independent ones, the road allowance people 
and the forgotten people – to name just a few.  
To outsiders, “Métis” is generally unhelpful as a defined term. 
There are several reasons for the confusion the term engenders. First, 
confusion results because the term is often erroneously applied to two 
distinct groups of people. It is used to refer to all individuals who have 
mixed Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal ancestry. These same individuals 
are sometimes called non-status Indians, a term that reflects the fact that 
they are not registered under the Indian Act. Métis also is the self-
ascribed name of a distinct Aboriginal people — the historic Métis Na-
tion located in central, western Canada.23  
                                                                                                                                
21
  Sanders, Aboriginal Peoples and the Constitution (1981) 3 Alta. Law Rev. 410, at 
420. See previous use of the term “half-breeds” in the Manitoba Act, 1870, S.C. 1870, c. 3, 
R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 8, and in the Dominion Lands Act, S.C. 1870, c. 31, s. 125(e). 
22 
 The term “Métis” was a legal term in Canada prior to its use in section 35. It is used 
in the French version of the Manitoba Act, 1870.  
23
  For more on the history of the Métis Nation see: Report of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 4, c. 5 (1996) [hereinafter “RCAP Report”]; Dickason, Canada’s 
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The second source of the confusion arises from the fact that in the 
late 1960s and the early 1970s, the Canadian public became more 
sensitive to the language of naming. It is at this time that the term 
“half-breed” began to be understood as a pejorative term and subse-
quently fell into disrepute and disuse. It was also at this time that the 
term Métis began to be used to include all persons of mixed Aborigi-
nal and non-Aboriginal ancestry.  
A third source of confusion about Métis identity arises from the re-
lationship between Indians and Métis and the changing definition of 
“Indian” in the Indian Act.24 In 1985, largely in response to the political 
efforts of non-status Indians and Métis, the government introduced Bill 
C-31. This amendment to the Indian Act reinstated many thousands of 
Indians who had been struck off the Indian Act registry. Prior to regain-
ing their status as Indians, many had been calling themselves Métis. 
Indeed, many have both Indian and Métis ancestry. Bill C-31 had a 
considerable effect on the identity politics of Indians and Métis in Can-
ada. Many of those who were reinstated will not be legally able to pass 
their Indian status on to their children and so, while for at least for the 
first generation, Bill C-31 substantially increased the numbers of Indians 
and decreased the numbers of Métis, their children or grandchildren will 
likely revert to pre-1985 status.  
Another contributing factor is that the federal government accepts 
jurisdiction for Indians on reserve, but all governments in Canada deny 
jurisdiction for off-reserve Indians and Métis.25 This has contributed to 
the tendency to lump these two separate peoples together. This jurisdic-
                                                                                                                                
First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times (1994), at 306-318; Sig-
gins, Riel: A Life of Revolution (1994); Sprague, Canada and the Métis, 1869-1885 (1988); 
Purich, The Métis (1988); Sealey and Lussier, The Métis: Canada’s Forgotten People (1975). 
24
  Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. 
25
  Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (1997), at 27-24. Also see Chartier, “Indians: 
An Analysis of the Term They Used in s. 91(24) of the British North America Act, 1867” 
(1978-1979) 43 S.L.R. 39; Morse and Giokas, “Do Métis Fall Within Section 91(24) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867?” in Aboriginal Self-Government: Legal and Constitutional Issues 
(1995); McMahon and Martin, “The Métis and 91(24): Is Inclusion the Issue?” in Aboriginal 
Self-Government: Legal and Constitutional Issues (1995). 
For contra see Flanagan, “The Case Against Métis Aboriginal Rights” (1983) 9 Can. 
Pub. Pol’y 314; Schwartz, “First Principles: Constitutional Reform with Respect to the 
Aboriginal Peoples of Canada” (1986). 
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tional denial was looked on with disfavor in R. v. Grumbo, where 
Wakeling J.A., in his dissenting judgment had this to say: 
I view it as unfortunate that there appears to be a considerable amount of 
tactical manoeuvring involved in the positions taken by the federal and 
provincial authorities with respect to issues of this nature …  
… This province probably felt obliged to maintain the position it had 
consistently taken that the Métis are a federal responsibility … This 
position the Province has adopted leads to the judicial temptation to 
conclude it cannot blow hot and cold … I refrain from such temptation 
only because I have decided the position taken by the Province is, in all 
likelihood, one thrust upon it by the historical inability of governments to 
agree on the extent of the responsibility owed to the Métis and which level 
of government has that responsibility. It is a political rather than a legal 
foundation which they stand upon … 
It is of interest that the Federal government was made aware of this appeal 
and chose not to become involved. It too may have had the difficulty of 
denying responsibility for the Métis since it is their position the Métis 
were not included as an Indian in s. 91(24) and at the same time 
acknowledging the existence of certain rights of the Métis now recognized 
in s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. These inconsistencies in the position 
of governments reinforce my view that the judicial process should give 
but scant attention to the positions they have adopted as they appear to be 
tainted by considerations beyond those which are properly relevant to a 
judicial determination.26 
Prior to the creation of reserves, both Indians and Métis shared terri-
tory, usually peacefully. Although their homes and camps were usually 
adjacent to but separate from those of the Indians, the Métis and Indians 
usually shared harvesting areas and maintained close family ties. After 
treaties were entered into, Indians gradually began to relocate to re-
serves, a process that was accelerated as laws requiring attendance at 
schools began to be enforced. After the creation of the reserves, some 
but not all Métis also moved onto the new Indian reserves, married into 
and became part of the Indian culture. However, many who moved onto 
the reserves maintained their identity as Métis despite being legally 
registered as “Indians”. Indeed this was the story revealed by Gwynneth 
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  R. v. Grumbo, [1998] 3 C.N.L.R. 172, at paras. 83-87, [1998] S.J. No. 331, revg 
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Jones, the Crown’s historical expert during the Powley trial. The Métis 
who went to live on the Garden River reserve near Sault Ste Marie 
never merged with the Ojibway residents of the reserve.27  
In the 1890s, the Ontario government gave former Magistrate Bor-
ron a mandate to determine ways to decrease the numbers of persons on 
the treaty annuity lists. Following the new Indian Act of 1876, which 
declared for the first time that Indians were to be determined according 
to their father’s heritage, Borron claimed that the Métis, who for the 
most part are the descendents of Indian women, had no legitimate 
claims to either land, annuities or treaty rights. In very frank language 
Mr. Borron stated that: 
Had he [W.B. Robinson] intended to include, or ever anticipated — that 
French Canadians and French Half-breeds or other breeds of like 
fecundity and longevity — were to be recognized as Indians by the 
Department of Indian Affairs and permitted to draw Annuities which his 
Province would be called upon to pay a man of the Hon. W.B. Robinson’s 
sagacity and shrewdness would surely have inserted a clause in the treaty 
to protect the Province from such an imposition.28 
As a result of Borron’s report, the “breeds of like fecundity and lon-
gevity” were removed from the reserve and lost their status under the 
Indian Act. Many, including the Powleys’ ancestors, simply returned to 
the nearby Métis community that persisted in the vicinity. 
Métis rarely take on Indian status in order to become “Indians” cul-
turally. Rather, they usually choose Indian status in order to take advan-
tage of the benefits that are available to those recognized as Indians. 
Olaf Bjornaa gave a poignant illustration of this in Powley. At trial, Mr. 
Bjornaa was asked why he finally accepted Bill C-31 status when he 
said he’d identify as Métis until the day he died. Mr. Bjornaa told the 
court that he had been a commercial fisherman all his life. Recently he’d 
had an accident on his boat. As a result he couldn’t fish any more and 
could no longer make a living from his fishing. While he retained his 
commercial fishing licences he was denied any social assistance. Since 
fishing licences can be inherited or used by other family members, he 
didn’t want to give them up. But Mr. Bjornaa was raising his grandchil-
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dren and he now required over $300 a month in medicine. Taking Bill 
C-31 was a pragmatic necessity. Mr. Bjornaa needed access to the 
health benefits available to status Indians but denied to Métis.29 
The issue of Métis identity is sensitive, has many layers and has al-
ways been complicated. Identity can also mean different things in dif-
ferent contexts. So with all of the above in mind we can ask the question 
— who are the Métis?30 There appear to be at least three answers to this 
question: (1) Métis are individuals with mixed European and Aboriginal 
blood; or (2) Métis are an Aboriginal people; or (3) Métis are those who 
describe themselves as such in order to claim the protection of section 
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
The first category is relatively self-explanatory. Anyone with any 
Aboriginal ancestry, no matter how remote, can self-identify as Métis 
and many programs and services are granted on the basis of self-
identification. However, mere self-identification is not sufficient for the 
purposes of claiming constitutional rights. This is because the recogni-
tion and affirmation of Aboriginal rights under section 35 of the Consti-
tution Act, 1982 is reserved for the “aboriginal peoples of Canada”. The 
word “peoples” is used three times in section 35. It means that unless an 
individual can also prove membership in a Métis collective, she will not 
likely be able to claim section 35 protection for her rights. This line of 
reasoning can be seen in recent case law.31 It has now been affirmed by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Powley: 
The term “Métis” in s. 35 does not encompass all individuals with mixed 
Indian and European heritage; rather, it refers to distinctive peoples who, 
in addition to their mixed ancestry, developed their own customs, way of 
life, and recognizable group identity separate from their Indian or Inuit 
and European forebears.32 
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  Powley trial transcripts, volume 4, “Testimony of Olaf Bjornaa”.  
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(1991) Alta. L. Rev. 29. 
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  R. v. Howse, [2000] B.C.J. No. 905 (Prov. Ct.), revd [2002] B.C.J. No. 379 (S.C.); 
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With respect to the second category, in Powley, the Supreme Court 
of Canada discussed the fact that there may be more than one Métis 
people in Canada: 
The Métis of Canada share the common experience of having forged a 
new culture and a distinctive group identity from their Indian or Inuit and 
European roots. This enables us to speak in general terms of “the Métis”. 
However, particularly given the vast territory of what is now Canada, we 
should not be surprised to find that different groups of Métis exhibit their 
own distinctive traits and traditions. This diversity among groups of Métis 
may enable us to speak of Métis “peoples”, a possibility left open by the 
language of s. 35(2), which speaks of the “Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples 
of Canada”.33 
With respect to the third category, since the inclusion of the Métis 
as one of the “aboriginal peoples of Canada” in section 35, the term 
Métis is now a legal term, much like the term Indian. Some Aboriginal 
people, who do not culturally identify as Métis, are now claiming the 
constitutional protection of the legal term Métis. An example of this 
kind of claim can be found in the factum of the Intervener, the Labrador 
Métis Nation, at the Supreme Court of Canada in Powley, in which they 
stated that the “Labrador Métis” use the constitutional descriptor of 
“Métis” even though it was an Inuit culture. 
Will the courts agree that the constitutional protection of the legal 
term “Métis” is available to those who are not culturally identified as 
Métis? The Supreme Court of Canada addressed this issue in R. v. Blais. 
In that case the question was whether Métis were “Indians” for the pur-
poses of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements (NRTA). The Court 
said that the Métis are not included in the legal term “Indians”. The 
Court looked to the common language understanding of the term “In-
dian” at the time the NRTA was enacted — 1930. The Court said that it 
would not “overshoot” the actual purpose of the right and that the con-
stitutional provision was not to be interpreted as if it was enacted in a 
vacuum: 
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… the terms “Indian” and “half-breed” were used to refer to separate and 
distinguishable groups of people in Manitoba from the mid-19th century 
through the period in which the NRTA was negotiated and enacted.34 
In view of this analysis, it seems likely that groups who culturally 
identify as “Indians” or “Inuit”, would not be “Métis” for the purposes 
of section 35 because they would not meet the plain language test set 
out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Blais.  
Despite the complexities of Métis identification set out above, his-
torically the Métis were part of the political, social and legal fabric of 
Canada since at least 1763. The recognition of the Métis and their inclu-
sion in section 35 is not a new recognition. In fact, it is part of a long 
history of government recognition of the Métis. The Crown has consis-
tently recognized that Métis were part of the Aboriginal landscape and 
dealt with them in recognition that they had Aboriginal rights. However, 
with a few exceptions, government dealt with Métis as individuals and 
refused to deal with the Métis as a collective.  
Prior to the 1830s, the British imperial government treated the Métis 
like all other Aboriginal people in North America. For example, the 
Métis shared in the annual distribution of presents given by the Crown 
to Aboriginal allies. Originally instituted by the French and later contin-
ued by the British, the giving of presents was an important symbolic 
means of cementing the friendship and alliance of Aboriginal peoples 
and the Crown. Métis warriors fought along with other Aboriginal war-
riors as allies of the British Crown in the War of 1812.35  
After 1830, British policy in Canada, with respect to the Métis be-
gan to shift. The government, in its policies and law, began to separate 
Métis from Indians. This shift had only one motivation — government’s 
desire to decrease its financial obligations to Aboriginal people by re-
ducing the sheer numbers of those who were considered to be Aborigi-
nal. In 1846, the Bagot Commission recommended that: 
Crown financial obligations were to be reduced … and only persons listed 
as band members would be entitled to treaty payments … [recommending 
that] the following classes of persons be ineligible to receive these 
payments; all persons of mixed Indian and non-Indian blood who had not 
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been adopted by the band; all Indian women who married non-Indian men 
and their children …36 
The policy was reiterated by the Pennefather Commission of 1858, 
which had a mandate to find effective methods of decreasing govern-
ment financial obligations to Indians. It recommended that one of the 
most efficient ways to decrease these costs would be to cut the Métis off 
the treaty lists.37  
In Manitoba in 1869, Canada negotiated with the Métis as a collec-
tive. That negotiation resulted in the Manitoba Act, 1870, which set 
aside 1.4 million acres “… for the benefit of the families of the half-
breed residents”.38 In 1875, in the Addendum to Treaty Three by the 
Half Breeds of Rainy Lake/Rainy River, the Métis adhered to the treaty 
as a collective. In the numbered treaties on the Prairies and in the 
Northwest Territories, government officials met with Métis and Indians 
at the same time to discuss the treaty, but then used different mecha-
nisms for each. Indians received treaty. Métis received scrip, issued 
pursuant to the Dominion Lands Act.39 In each of these circumstances 
the Métis sought to have their Aboriginal claims recognized. They were 
acknowledged as having Aboriginal claims, although for the most part, 
they were dealt with as individuals and treated differently than Indians.  
This is why the recognition of the Métis in section 35(2) is not a 
new recognition. And because the recognition of the Métis is not new, 
their inclusion in section 35 cannot be interpreted as merely a political 
compromise. The inclusion of the Métis in section 35 is part of a contin-
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uum begun much earlier, implemented as part of the doctrine of Abo-
riginal rights as articulated in the Royal Proclamation, and affirmed by 
government actions and in statutes, treaties and constitutional instru-
ments.  
What is new about section 35 is the solid commitment to deal with 
the Métis as an Aboriginal people from 1982 on. The government’s 
failure to consistently treat the Métis as a people was the foundation of 
the old and difficult grievances that required reconciliation with the 
Métis. The very survival of the Métis into the 21st century is a testament 
to their collective strength and aspirations. It was in 1763 with the 
Pontiac Uprisings that the Métis first began to assert their Aboriginal 
rights. These assertions continued with the Battle of Seven Oaks in 
1816, the Sayer trial in 1849, Mica Bay in 1849, Red River in 1870, the 
Half-breed Addendum to Treaty #3 in 1875, at Saskatchewan (Duck 
Lake, Fish Creek and Batoche) in 1885, and again in the events leading 
up to 1982.40  
As settlement moved west, and the government concluded treaties 
with the Indians, the Métis faced the continuing challenge of maintain-
ing their collectivity.  
… Increasing immigration and development consumed their historical 
lands at a distressing rate. Increasingly restrictive hunting laws, with 
which they were required to comply despite their Aboriginal heritage, 
made it more and more difficult to follow traditional pursuits. While they 
were never well off, Indian people at least had their reserves and benefited 
from various social services provided by the government of Canada. Not 
so the Métis … Game was scarce, prohibitively expensive fishing licences 
were required, and white settlement was spreading remorselessly. The 
majority of the Métis were reduced to squatting on the fringes of Indian 
reserves and white settlements and on road allowances. The ‘independent 
ones,’ who had been the diplomats and brokers of the entire northwest 
were now being referred to as the ‘road allowance people’.41  
This excerpt from the RCAP Report specifically discusses the Al-
berta Métis. Yet, Alberta is the only province that has maintained some 
                                                                                                                                
40
  For Pontiac Uprisings see Testimony of Dr. Lytwyn, Powley Trial Transcripts, vol. 3, 
at 3-151; For Mica Bay see Testimony of Dr. Ray, Powley Trial Transcripts, vol. 2, at 124-
288. For other Metis assertions see RCAP Report, supra, note 23, at vol. 4, c. 5. 
41
  RCAP Report, supra, note 23, at vol. 4, c. 5, at 227. 
310  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
affirmative action with respect to the Métis. Governments by and large 
have refused to acknowledge the existence of the Métis as a people. The 
Métis were intentionally ignored or displaced and became known as the 
“forgotten people”. With no protected collective lands, the Métis culture 
was constantly threatened by wave after wave of settlers with an agri-
cultural lifestyle. Yet, despite all of this, the Métis survived. They 
slipped from public awareness and as with all Aboriginal peoples in 
Canada, they lived for decades in relative obscurity. Canadians grew 
into their maturity as a country during this time but with respect to their 
memories of the Métis “down they forgot as up they grew”.42 
Some people think that the Metis Nation history ended on the Batoche 
battlefield or the Regina gallows. The bitterness of those experiences did 
cause the Metis to avoid the spotlight for many years, but they continued 
to practise and perserve Metis culture and to do everything possible to 
pass it on to future generations.43 
The story told by Olaf Bjornaa at trial — that he and his sister were 
turned away from the reserve school (because they were not Indians) 
and the non-Aboriginal school (because they were Indians), is indicative 
of the Métis place in Canadian society – “You’re almost a person in 
your own homeland.”44  
However, while the Métis may have been forgotten by the public 
and government, they did not disappear. The Métis quietly continued to 
persevere and in the 1960s, along with Indian and Inuit organizations, 
they began to re-emerge with new political organizations to speak for 
their rights.  
In Sparrow, the Chief Justice stated the reasons why it was necessary 
to protect Aboriginal rights in the Constitution. He quoted MacDonald J. 
when he stated that we “cannot recount with much pride the treatment 
accorded to the native people of this country”.45 The same kind of his-
torical reasons underlie the decision by the federal government and nine 
provinces to expressly include Métis and their Aboriginal and treaty 
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rights in the Constitution Act, 1982. O’Neill J. perhaps stated it best 
when he held that: 
The purposes underlying the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by 
s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 relate to both prior occupation, and 
reconciliation. What, however, are the reasons underlying the protection 
that s. 35(1) gives, and what is the basis for the special protection that 
aboriginal peoples generally, and Métis people specifically, have within 
Canadian society? Surely, at the heart of s. 35(1), lies a recognition that 
aboriginal rights are a matter of fundamental justice protecting the 
survival of aboriginal people, as a people, on their lands. The Métis have 
aboriginal rights, as people, based on their prior use and occupation as a 
people. It is a matter of fairness and fundamental justice that the 
aboriginal rights of the Métis which flow from this prior use and 
occupation, be recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution 
Act, 1982.46  
The Ontario Crown, in Powley urged the court not to treat the Métis 
as a people but rather as individuals who are simply the descendents of 
Indians, with their rights and existence determined by their Indian an-
cestors, their Indian blood quantum and their Indian lifestyle. The court 
rejected this submission, 
This theory in effect would deny to Métis their full status as distinctive 
rights-bearing peoples whose own integral practices are entitled to 
constitutional protection under s. 35(1).47 
In fact there would have been no reason to include the Métis in sec-
tion 35 if they were to be treated as individuals who are part Indian. The 
recognition — that the Métis are a distinct people — is one of the most 
fundamental reasons that required the inclusion of the Métis in section 
35. The failure of governments to recognize and affirm the Métis as a 
people is the old and difficult grievance of the Métis. Government’s 
predominant pattern — treating Métis as individuals — is exactly what 
is needed and still needs to change.  
                                                                                                                                
46
 R. v. Powley, [2000] O.J. No. 99, at para. 16, [2002] O.J. No. 99 (S.C.J.). 
47
 Powley, 2003 SCC 43, at para. 38, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43. 
312  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
V. WHEN DOES THE CROWN HAVE TO ACT?48 
 The relationship between the Crown and the Métis first came 
before the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Powley. It is in Powley that 
the Court affirmed that the Métis are an Aboriginal collective with their 
own distinctive practices, customs and traditions. It set out a test for 
identifying the section 35 harvesting rights of the Métis. The Court held 
that the purpose for including Métis in section 35 was to enhance “their 
survival as distinctive communities”49 and to “protect practices that 
were historically important”.50  
The inclusion of the Métis in s. 35 represents Canada’s commitment to 
recognize and value the distinctive Métis cultures … which the framers of 
the Constitution Act, 1982 recognized can only survive if the Métis are 
protected along with other Aboriginal communities.51  
The duty to protect is a positive duty on the Crown. After all, non-
interference may be achieved by inaction, but protection cannot be im-
plemented in the abstract or in the negative. Protection also cannot be 
achieved by the enactment of policies, regulations or laws that affect, 
but do not address Métis rights. As the Supreme Court of Canada noted 
in Sparrow, Aboriginal peoples are justifiably suspicious of “neutral” 
rules that in reality place insurmountable obstacles that bar the exercise 
of their rights.52  
The Crown argues that it has no constitutional or fiduciary obliga-
tions to Aboriginal peoples generally, and no obligations to Métis spe-
cifically, unless and until there is a court finding. By this, the Crown 
means a specific finding of a specific right for each and every separate 
Aboriginal people.  
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In support of its argument, the Crown takes the position that the 
constitutional obligations of section 35 are limited to Sparrow-type 
situations. In that kind of case, a defence against a prosecution, the 
courts have defined one of the Crown’s duties as a duty to justify their 
actions. But the Supreme Court of Canada has never said that the 
Crown’s duty only arises after a court has proclaimed the existence of 
an Aboriginal right, nor has it said that court determinations are the only 
source of the Crown’s duties to Aboriginal peoples. On the contrary, the 
Supreme Court has always proceeded on the basis that the duty existed 
before the Court’s determination of the right and that the Crown has to 
justify its infringement as of the time of the offence, not as of the time 
of the court judgment.  
The Supreme Court also said, in Adams, that it is unconstitutional 
for the Crown to adopt an unstructured discretionary regime that risks 
infringing Aboriginal rights in a substantial number of applications.53 
This is hardly the kind of statement that can only apply to after-the-fact 
justification. Rather, it speaks to the general obligations of the Crown 
and is a positive duty. It arises without the adjudication of specific 
rights. 
The discussion of the Crown’s duty to consult in Delgamuukw also 
reflects the view that Crown obligations arise prior to the adjudication 
of Aboriginal rights or title: 
… the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples 
may be satisfied by the involvement of Aboriginal peoples in decisions 
taken with respect to their lands. There is always a duty of consultation … 
The nature and scope of the duty of consultation will vary with the 
circumstances. In occasional cases, when the breach is less serious or 
relatively minor, it will be no more than a duty to discuss important 
decisions that will be taken with respect to lands held pursuant to 
Aboriginal title. Of course, even in those rare cases when the minimum 
acceptable standard is consultation, this consultation must be in good 
faith, and with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns of the 
Aboriginal people whose lands are at issue. In most cases, it will be 
significantly deeper than mere consultation. Some cases may even require 
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the full consent of an Aboriginal nation, particularly when provinces enact 
hunting and fishing regulations in relation to Aboriginal lands.54  
Sparrow, Adams and Delgamuukw therefore, cannot be reconciled 
with the position that the Crown’s obligations do not arise until particu-
lar section 35 rights are determined. Practically speaking, if the Crown 
has no obligations to Aboriginal people until specific rights are adjudi-
cated, Aboriginal peoples have no constitutional protection. Under such 
an interpretation, Aboriginal peoples will be forced to flood the courts 
because that would be the only way to stop the Crown from charging 
Aboriginal people with harvesting violations, alienating Crown lands 
and resources, or authorizing impacts to land-related Aboriginal inter-
ests. This cannot be correct and no one can afford this enormous litiga-
tion agenda.  
This position, that the Crown has no obligations prior to a court-
determined right, contains two errors. First, it prioritizes justification 
and infringement over recognition and affirmation. Second, it assumes 
that constitutional and fiduciary duties only arise in the context of justi-
fication. This focus on justification instead of the affirmative purpose of 
section 35 is clearly misguided. The justification scheme cannot be used 
to determine the existence of Aboriginal rights. Justification reflects one 
fact only, that such rights are not absolute. In this way it is similar to 
section 1 of the Charter. Just as section 1 does not define the nature of 
governments’ obligations under the Charter, the Crown’s obligations 
pursuant to section 35 also cannot be defined through the lens of justifi-
cation. 
As noted in Delgamuukw, the Crown has, at minimum, an obliga-
tion to act “with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns of 
the Aboriginal people whose lands are at issue”.55 In Taku River Tlin-
gits, the B.C. Court of Appeal found that the duties of the Crown were 
triggered by the assertions of the Aboriginal peoples and did not require 
a court finding. The court said that to find otherwise would have the 
effect of robbing section 35(1) of much of its constitutional significance: 
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In my opinion, nothing … provides any support for the proposition that 
Aboriginal rights or title must be established in court proceedings before 
the Crown’s duty or obligation to consult arises. 56  
The B.C. Court of Appeal in Haida Nation stated the obligation even 
more forcefully:57 
So the trust-like relationship and its concomitant fiduciary duty permeates 
the whole relationship between the Crown, in both of its sovereignties, 
federal and provincial, on the one hand, and the aboriginal peoples on the 
other. One manifestation of the fiduciary duty of the Crown to the 
aboriginal peoples is that it grounds a general guiding principle for s. 
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
It would be contrary to that guiding principle to interpret s. 35(1) … as if 
it required that before an aboriginal right could be recognized and 
affirmed, it first had to be made the subject matter of legal proceedings; 
then proved to the satisfaction of a judge of competent jurisdiction; and 
finally made the subject of a declaratory or other order of the court. That 
is not what s. 35(1) says and it would be contrary to the guiding principles 
of s. 35(1), as set out in R. v. Sparrow, to give it that interpretation.  
The Ontario Court of Appeal expressed a similar opinion in Powley. 
In that case Sharpe J. said, 
I do not accept that uncertainty about identifying those entitled to assert 
Métis rights can be accepted as a justification for denying the right …The 
basic position of the government seems to have been simply to deny that 
these rights exist, absent a decision from the courts to the contrary… The 
government cannot simply sit on its hands and then defend its inaction 
because the nature of the right or the identity of the bearers of the right is 
uncertain.58 
The Supreme Court has not yet brought down a judgment that con-
sidered whether the Crown’s duties are triggered in the absence of a 
court finding, although Sparrow, Adams and Delgamuukw suggest there 
is such a duty.59 The Sparrow justification approach cannot exhaust the 
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  Haida Nation, supra, note 48, at para. 37. 
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  R. v. Powley, [2001] O.J. No. 607, at para. 166, [2001] O.J. No. 607 (C.A.).  
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role of section 35 in the relationship between the Crown and the Abo-
riginal peoples of Canada. 
The courts in Taku River Tlingits and in Haida held that the 
Crown’s duties were triggered by threats to vulnerable Aboriginal inter-
ests rather than the adjudication of rights. The Powleys indeed argued 
just this trigger in their argument with respect to the necessary change to 
the contact test for Métis. Before the Supreme Court, the Powleys sub-
mitted that the relevant time to determine the rights of the Sault Ste 
Marie Métis community was the time just prior to 1850, when the 
Crown’s obligations arose pursuant to the Royal Proclamation. The 
historical record showed that the Crown had authorized non-Aboriginal 
third party activities just prior to 1850 when control was shifting away 
from the Aboriginal peoples in possession. This was the time when, 
with respect to the Sault Ste Marie Métis community, the Crown’s fidu-
ciary obligations arose and when its obligations to implement the equi-
table principles in the Royal Proclamation crystallized. 
This approach mirrors the practices of the Crown in making treaties 
to implement the equitable principles of the Royal Proclamation. His-
torically, treaty making involved no exhaustive analysis to determine the 
practices, customs or traditions of the Aboriginal people at contact, nor 
was there any attempt to determine eligibility based on length of occu-
pation.60 On the contrary, the Crown properly entered into treaty with 
the Indians who were in possession at the time. Each time the Crown 
implemented the equitable principles from the Royal Proclamation — 
beginning in the Upper Great Lakes with the Robinson Treaties and 
continuing west with the numbered treaties — it negotiated when it 
wanted to access lands and resources for settlement, mining or forestry 
development or in order to build transportation corridors.  
It is suggested that this is the appropriate trigger for Crown obliga-
tions — when it seeks to authorize activities that stand to affect Abo-
riginal interests. Once that trigger has been activated, the Crown is 
under an obligation to effectively protect Aboriginal communities and 
the lands and resources on which they rely. This trigger and the result-
ing obligations would apply to all Aboriginal peoples — including the 
Métis. 
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VI. HOW DOES THE CROWN HAVE TO ACT? 
Once the trigger has been activated, the Crown is obligated to un-
dertake all activities with a view to ensuring that it substantially ad-
dresses the concerns and interests of Aboriginal peoples. This 
necessitates consultation and accommodation. The Crown’s duty is not 
satisfied unless it fulfils both. 
The Supreme Court said, in Delgamuukw, that there is always a re-
quirement to consult when Aboriginal rights may be infringed.61 Con-
sultation is constitutionally mandated although it will usually be 
triggered by a pending exercise of statutory power. The decision in 
Adams goes further, requiring statutory regimes in respect of land and 
resources to provide rules for complying with the duty: 
… In light of the Crown’s unique fiduciary obligations towards aboriginal 
peoples, Parliament may not simply adopt an unstructured discretionary 
administrative regime which risks infringing aboriginal rights in a 
substantial number of applications in the absence of some explicit 
guidance. If a statute confers an administrative discretion which may carry 
significant consequences for the exercise of an aboriginal right, the statute 
or its delegate regulations must outline specific criteria for the granting or 
refusal of that discretion which seek to accommodate the existence of 
aboriginal rights …62 
Consultation has two parts. It is intended to fulfil government’s ob-
ligation to inform Aboriginal peoples and to inform itself. This includes 
informing itself and the affected Aboriginal peoples about the signifi-
cance of any actions government is about to undertake, the effects of 
such actions and how those effects might be mitigated. Because the 
ecological, cultural or economic impacts on Aboriginal peoples are not 
always obvious, Aboriginal people have a role to play in providing that 
information and analysis.63 They can only do this effectively if govern-
ment is genuinely seeking to inform itself.  
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Accommodation is intended to fulfil the Crown’s obligation to 
exercise its authority so as to protect Aboriginal peoples. Effective 
accommodation measures will vary with the circumstances but the goal 
of accommodation is not to trade off or surrender Aboriginal interests 
and rights. Rather, the goal is to ensure Aboriginal interests and rights 
will survive and can be effectively exercised. At minimum, accommo-
dation requires the Crown to refuse to authorize proposals that would 
either undermine or endanger Aboriginal interests, especially the inter-
ests needed to sustain them as an Aboriginal people.  
If the Crown chooses to exercise its legal authority in the absence of 
substantive consultation with the Aboriginal collective or in the absence 
of an agreement on accommodation, any authorization that it grants will 
suffer from a fundamental legal defect. This would be so if the Crown 
has not fulfilled its duty to consult and accommodate according to the 
standards of loyalty and prudence to which fiduciaries are held.64  
Whether the Crown has fulfilled its duty to consult and accommo-
date will not depend on initiatives that are alleged to accommodate the 
Aboriginal interest, or whether the Crown has considered Aboriginal 
concerns, taken some mitigation steps, or acted rationally as opposed to 
arbitrarily. The duty is not procedural it is substantive. The fulfilment of 
the duty depends on whether the Crown substantially addressed the 
interests of the Aboriginal peoples.  
VII. THE COMPLEXITIES OF CONSULTATION WITH THE MÉTIS 
With respect to the Métis, it is suggested that the Crown has the 
same consultation obligations that it has to all other Aboriginal peoples. 
It must take steps to inform the Métis about its pending actions. And it 
must inform itself about how its actions might affect the Métis collec-
tive.  
With respect to how the government is to fulfill its consultation ob-
ligations, three issues have arisen since Powley that show the complexi-
ties of consultation with the Métis. First, with whom is the government 
obligated to consult — who represents the Métis qua Métis? Second, is 
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a Métis collective synonymous with a physical community? Third, is 
there an obligation on each Métis individual to provide provincial gov-
ernments with evidence that meets the Powley test prior to exercising a 
Métis harvesting right?  
As a general principle, the government’s consultation obligation 
must be directed to the Aboriginal peoples, as a collective, because 
Aboriginal rights are collective rights. Consultation with individual 
members of the collective can only inform government about that indi-
vidual’s interests. It cannot fully inform government about the collective 
interests or aspirations of an Aboriginal people.  
As with consultation implemented with Indians, consultation with 
Métis must begin with their elected representatives. This is, admittedly, 
a more complicated task for Métis than for Indians because Métis do not 
live in discrete physical communities equivalent to reserves. Métis peo-
ple in any given region are rarely synonymous with a physical town, 
village or city. This is because the Crown did not relocate Métis into 
geographically distinct areas as it did when it relocated Indians onto 
reserves. The Métis continue to live, as most Aboriginal people lived 
prior to the creation of reserves, scattered throughout their traditional 
territory. Some live on reserves, some live adjacent to reserves, some 
live in the bush, some live in cities, towns or villages. Statistics show 
that the Métis have always been a highly mobile people and it is inter-
esting to note that this characteristic has not changed. Indeed the latest 
census data shows that the Métis continue to move more than average 
Canadians.65 Under these circumstances, consultation with Métis collec-
tives is complicated but not an insurmountable task. 
Can the Crown fulfil its consultation obligation with respect to the 
Métis by consulting with local municipal representatives? While it will 
obviously be important for the Crown to engage in consultations with 
municipal representatives, this would likely not fulfil the Crown’s con-
sultation obligation with respect to the Métis and their section 35 rights. 
Municipal representatives have no jurisdiction, authority or mandate to 
deal with the Métis qua Métis. They have limited jurisdiction pursuant 
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to their governing statute and within the geographic territory of their 
municipality. But municipal representatives have no mandate or author-
ity to represent Métis with respect to the exercise of Métis rights or title. 
Municipal representatives are particularly inappropriate when one con-
siders that elected municipal representative may not even be Métis and 
that the exercise of many Métis rights, such as hunting, fishing and 
trapping, take place well outside municipal boundaries.  
Would the Crown’s consultation obligation be fulfilled by consulta-
tion with Métis organizations? For Indians, the Crown instituted Chief 
and Council on reserves and gradually these bodies have replaced the 
traditional forms of governance and become recognized in law as the 
official representatives for all purposes including consultation. The 
Crown has never established similar political or legal bodies for the 
Métis. As a result, the self-created, ballot-box elected Métis organiza-
tions are the only entities in existence that have the structure and man-
date to represent Métis qua Métis. 66  
Governments are extremely reluctant and have refused to recognize 
the authority of these Métis created organizations for consultation pur-
poses.67 Governments question the Métis organizations’ membership 
rules, question their authority and deny them recognition, resources and 
respect. In view of the fact that the Crown has neglected to maintain its 
own Métis records, has not adequately funded these organizations to 
enable them to develop verifiable records, and in the absence of any 
other viable entities, it is difficult to understand how the Crown can 
fulfill its constitutional and fiduciary consultation obligations without 
consulting Métis organizations.  
The fact that Métis organizations are legally capable of representing 
the Métis for the purposes of their constitutional rights has been before 
the courts in Manitoba in the case of Manitoba Métis Federation v. 
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Canada (previously known as Dumont).68 The federal government 
moved to have the claim struck and a majority of the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal agreed. O’Sullivan J.A. dissented: 
The problem confronting us is how can the rights of the Métis people as a 
people be asserted. Must they turn to international bodies or to the 
conscience of humanity to obtain redress for their grievances as a people, 
or is it possible for us at the request of their representatives, to recognize 
their people claims as justiciable? 
In my opinion … the rights of the Métis people must be capable of being 
asserted by somebody. If not by the present plaintiffs, then by whom?  
The Supreme Court unanimously overturned the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal decision, which has the effect of reinforcing O’Sullivan J.A.’s 
finding that the Manitoba Métis Federation is an appropriate legal entity 
to represent Métis with respect to their Métis rights. It would seem logi-
cal that if the Manitoba Métis Federation can sue on behalf of the Métis 
with respect to their Métis rights, the Crown should also consult with 
them in respect of those same rights when it contemplates activities that 
stand to affect them. 
In other developments post-Powley, evidentiary issues have arisen. 
The Supreme Court of Canada set out a test for ascertaining whether an 
individual can claim the protection of section 35 for Métis harvesting 
rights. Despite the Court’s emphasis on the fact that Métis are a people 
with collective rights, and despite the Court’s statements with respect to 
the urgent priority that must be afforded to standardizing Métis identifi-
cation, provincial governments have made few moves in this regard and 
are refusing to recognize identification cards issued by Métis organiza-
tions. Instead, government is placing the burden of proof on each indi-
vidual Métis who seeks to exercise her harvesting rights and in the 
absence of such proof is laying charges.  
The quantity and cost of providing such voluminous evidence can-
not be underestimated. Under such a demand and prior to exercising 
their harvesting rights, each individual Métis must provide a genealogy 
complete with supporting documentation. Each individual Métis must 
provide a full history of her Métis collective, complete with proof of the 
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date of the assertion of effective control by the colonial government. 
Each individual Métis must also provide proof that she is an active par-
ticipant in the Métis community. Presumably such evidence could be 
adduced by evidence of participation in Métis social events, or in known 
Métis cultural activities such as jigging, playing the fiddle, beading or 
speaking Michif. Under these circumstances provincial natural resource 
officers become prosecutor, judge and jury. They determine whether 
there is a Métis collective, whether that collective has harvesting rights, 
the date of effective control, the sufficiency of genealogical evidence 
and whether the cultural connection to the Métis community is sufficient 
in terms of depth and length. This cannot be correct and if it is, the Mé-
tis cannot afford any more such “victories”. 
Surely this cannot be what the Supreme Court of Canada contemplated 
in establishing the Powley test. Yet Crown prosecutors are demanding all 
of this evidence from each individual who claims Métis harvesting 
rights in the new world post-Powley. It is a rather stunning reversal of 
the strong statements of a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada. The 
prosecutorial lens, combined with the government’s own abysmal igno-
rance about the Métis is being used to do exactly what the court said 
should not happen. Governments are not working with Métis organiza-
tions as an “urgent priority” to consult with the Métis collectives or to 
accommodate them in a way that substantially seeks to identify Métis 
rights holders. Rather the “urgent priority” seems to be to charge indi-
vidual Métis harvesters when they cannot discharge the impossible 
evidentiary burden the Crown has imposed under the guise of the Pow-
ley test. This is not a burden carried by any other Aboriginal peoples 
who seek to exercise their harvesting rights.  
The Crown’s actions since Powley defeat what the Supreme Court 
of Canada said was the purpose of section 35 — to “protect practices 
that were historically important”69 and in effect have eviscerated the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in Powley.  
It is suggested that the better way to proceed would be for govern-
ment to consult with Métis representatives and negotiate agreements 
that allow individual Métis to exercise their harvesting rights and pro-
vide the certainty that government needs. Until such agreements are in 
place, no prosecutions should be laid. The Crown should not take ad-
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vantage of the uncertainty and negotiation period by charging individual 
Métis for exercising the harvesting rights that have so recently been 
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada. Such restraint would be in 
keeping with the concept of holding the Crown to a high standard of 
honorable dealing with respect to the Métis.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
As can be seen from the post-Powley events, the Crown is continu-
ing its past practices and the very relationship that section 35 was 
supposed to change. The Crown focus remains on individual Métis 
rather than with the Métis collective. Plus ca change plus c’est la 
meme chose. It seems that the old and difficult grievances of the Métis 
remain to be reconciled.  
  
 
